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was one which the public had a right to hear, then the defendant had the right in the public interest to report it, the burden not being upon him to determine doubtful questions of law as to the jurisdiction.

MASTER AND SERVANT—PROCUREMENT OF DISCHARGE WHERE CONTRACT IS TERMINABLE AT WILL.—The defendant maliciously procured the discharge of the plaintiff from her employment, which was for an indefinite time. *Held,* he is liable in damages, though the plaintiff had no right of action against her employer. *Warschauser* v. *Brooklyn Furniture Co.,* 144 N. Y. Supp. 257 (App. Div.).

In such cases the right of the employer to discharge the employee is generally held to be immaterial. *Chambers* v. *Probst,* 145 Ky. 381, 140 S. W. 572; *Moran* v. *Dunphy,* 177 Mass. 485, 59 N. E. 125, 83 Am. St. Rep. 289, 52 L. R. A. 115; *Perkins* v. *Pendleton,* 90 Me. 166, 38 Atl. 96, 60 Am. St. Rep. 252. *Contra, Holder* v. *Cannon Mfg. Co.,* 138 N. C. 308, 50 S. E. 681.

But if the discharge is procured by a threat to exercise a legal right, it is said to be *damnum absque injuria. Tennessee, etc., Co.* v. *Kelly,* 163 Ala. 348, 50 So. 1008; *Raycroft* v. *Tayntor,* 68 Vt. 219, 35 Atl. 53, 54 Am. St. Rep. 882, 33 L. R. A. 225; *O'Brien* v. *Telegraph Co.,* 62 Wash. 598, 114 Pac. 441. Hence there is no right of action against union laborers who procure the plaintiff's discharge by threatening to strike, if the threat is unaccompanied by illegal acts. *Wunch* v. *Shankland,* 59 App. Div. 482, 69 N. Y. Supp. 349; *Kemp* v. *Association,* 225 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (injunction proceedings). And see *Carter* v. *Oster,* 134 Mo. App. 146, 112 S. W. 995; *Lucke* v. *Cutters' Assembly,* 77 Md. 396, 26 Atl. 505.

But whether a threat to exercise a legal right becomes itself illegal if actuated by malevolent motives is not well settled. It was formerly held that bad motive of itself could not make a tort out of a legal act. COOLEY, TORTS, § 17; *Allen* v. *Flood,* [1898] A. C. 1, 92, 151; *Jenkins* v. *Fowler,* 24 Pa. St. 308. But in recent years the rule stated has been frequently disregarded. *Webb* v. *Drake,* 52 La. Ann. 290, 26 So. 790; *Plant* v. *Woods,* 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011; *Delz* v. *Winfree,* 80 Tex. 400, 16 S. W. 111. See 18 HARV. LAW REV. 411; 28 AM. LAW REV. 47.

If the discharge is procured for a cause connected with the employment, the defendant's motives are immaterial. *Lancaster* v. *Hamburger,* 70 Ohio St. 156, 71 N. E. 289, 65 L. R. A. 856.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS — VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE ESTABLISHING PUBLIC HACK STANDS.—Pursuant to a city ordinance, a public hack stand was established in front of an abutting hotel owner's premises, without the latter's consent. *Held,* the ordinance is a valid street ordinance. *Hotel Astor* v. *City of New York,* 144 N. Y. Supp. 494 (App. Div.).

An abutting owner has property in the street to the extent of an easement of light, air, and access. Of this he cannot be deprived without just compensation. This is true even when the municipality owns the title in fee to the street. *Adams* v. *Chicago, etc., Ry. Co.,* 39 Minn. 286, 39 N. W. 629, 12 Am. St. Rep. 644; *Abendroth* v. *Manhattan, etc., Ry.*